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The role of capacity in
mental health laws –
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Kris Gledhill1
The context in which the Szmukler et al proposal is put forward is the several reviews in the different
jurisdictions in the United Kingdom and in Ireland, which have led to capacity becoming a central feature
in relation to civil detention in Scotland and in Ireland, and which may well lead to it becoming a central
feature in Northern Ireland, though efforts to achieve the same in England and Wales were rejected. 
For forensic patients, however, capacity is not prominent, and the proposal made goes further than recent
legislative amendments and debates have contemplated. These are set out in the order in which they
occurred: the Richardson Committee review of the English statute, then the amendments in Scotland,
followed by those in Ireland (which pre-dated those in Scotland but came into effect later); next was the
action that was eventually taken in relation to the English statute, and finally there are the proposals as
to what to do in Northern Ireland. The latter is the only one that comes close to the proposals of
Szmukler and others, which they acknowledge in their paper.
(i) The Richardson Committee
The first review was that by the Expert Committee appointed to advise the Secretary of State for Health
on the Mental Health Act 1983 for England and Wales (also known as the Richardson Committee), which
reported in November 19992. It suggested, in a chapter on underlying principles3, that treatment for
mental ill-health should be governed by principles similar to those relevant to physical ill-health, where
patients with capacity decide whether or not to accept treatment: providing similar respect for autonomy
in the mental health field was necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of mental disorder. The logic
of this would be that only those without capacity could be compelled to accept treatment. However, a
consultation exercise carried out by the Committee revealed that only a small minority of respondents
suggested that capacity to make decisions should be the only test: the larger body of opinion favoured
overriding decisions to refuse treatment by those with capacity when to do so was necessary for public
129
1 Barrister; Senior Lecturer, Law School, University of Auckland; Editor, Mental Health Law Reports.
2 Available at: http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4009576
(last accessed 29 August 2009)
3 Chapter 2
safety. The Committee supported this approach4, and so suggested that the criteria for an order for
compulsory treatment5 be phrased so that it could be met in alternative circumstances: either when the
patient was without capacity and compulsory care and treatment was necessary for his or her health or
safety, or to protect the patient from serious exploitation, or to protect others from serious harm; or, if the
patient had capacity, when there was a substantial risk of serious harm to other persons , or possibly to
the health or safety of the patient or to the safety of other persons if the patient was untreated6.
In relation to patients involved in the criminal justice system, the Committee noted7 that it had made
little progress in deciding the extent to which principles applicable to civil patients should be adjusted
when carried across to those in the criminal justice system. This was largely for pragmatic reasons: the
complexity of the panoply of existing regimes, and the lack of internal coherence; the uncertainty of
government policy in relation to those with severe personality disorders8; and the lack of time available
to it to consider the issues involved or to discuss them with the government department most involved,
the Home Office9. The Committee did, nevertheless, make several recommendations, including that
offenders who lacked capacity and met the criteria for a compulsory order should be dealt with primarily
according to their health needs10, that transfers be used when offenders met the civil criteria11, and that
the criminal courts should be able to make a health order if the offender met the criteria for a civil order
and lacked capacity12. The Committee did not conclude that those who retained capacity should be
excluded from treatment, noting that “to leave in prison offenders who could benefit from treatment
would not be productive of public safety”13; however, there was the contrary point that hospitals and
health professionals “should not be required to detain offenders who are persistently unwilling to engage
in treatment or who are untreatable”14. The belief the Committee expressed was that mentally disordered
offenders who retained capacity would probably be personality disordered and subject to a mental health
order only if there was the possibility of benefit to the patient: since this would invariably depend on
4 Para 2.7. The Committee noted that there was a “more
intractable dilemma”, namely what to do when the harm
involved is not to others but to the patient; the consultation
process did not produce any consensus on this. Arguments
as to whether to intervene to prevent self-harm or to
respect autonomous choices to self-harm “reflect a
difference in fundamental philosophy which can only be
resolved by according preference to one approach over the
other. We have set out the alternative views as best we can
and invite politicians to make the moral choice between
them” (para 2.11).
5 This was in the civil setting; it would be a judicial order,
made by a Tribunal.
6 Paras 5.94 and 5.95. There were other criteria for the
compulsory order: the presence of a mental disorder of
such seriousness as to require care and treatment under
specialist services; the proposed care and treatment be the
least restrictive alternative and be in the patient’s best
interests; treatment be available that was likely to prevent
a deterioration or secure an improvement.
7 Chapter 15
8 A consultation paper, ‘Managing Dangerous People with
Severe Personality Disorder’, was issued by the
Department of Health and the Home Office, in July 1999
(just days after the Richardson Committee report was
delivered to the Department of Health); available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-1999-
personality-disorder (last accessed 29 August 2009)
9 This was before the reorganisation of central government
that saw the creation of the Ministry of Justice, which took
some of the Home Office’s functions in relation to mental
health matters.
10 Para 15.9. They also suggested at para 15.15 that those
with a learning disability should be placed under the
framework for those with long-term capacity problems that
was being developed (and became the Mental Capacity
Act 2005); courts should be able to make an appropriate
order under the incapacity framework instead of imposing
a criminal sentence.
11 Para 15.16: the Committee noted that offenders could not
be denied appropriate healthcare without discrimination; in
Ch 16, the Committee recommended that, since the poor
quality of mental health services in prisons meant that
compulsory treatment in prison was inappropriate,
arrangements should be in place whereby prisoners could
be transferred to hospital for an assessment of their needs
and whether there should be a formal transfer to hospital.
12 Para 15.13.
13 Para 15.14.
14 Para 15.11.
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cooperation, it could be tested by the greater use of interim orders15. The Committee supported the
retention of the Restriction Order regime16, which was described as “an essential safeguard” in the
identification of “high risk cases”: however, it should rest on a special risk assessment so that those dealing
with the offender subsequently could know the basis for its imposition17.
It was some time before new legislation was forthcoming for England and Wales: it did not incorporate
capacity principles and is discussed below: a more speedy process was followed in Scotland, which did put
capacity as a central feature, but only on relation to civil detention.
(ii) The MacLean Committee and the Millan Committee
The Scottish Executive also established a review of its legislation, the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984,
by the Millan Committee, which was appointed in February 1999 and reported in January 200118. There
was also the MacLean Committee, more officially the Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual
Offenders, which reported in June 200019; its recommendations were subject to comment by the Millan
Committee. The MacLean Committee had concluded that the range of sentences available to the
criminal courts in Scotland was suitable except in relation to a small number of offenders who posed a
high and continuing risk to the public, for whom there should be a new sentence, the Order for Lifelong
Restriction20. It felt that a small number of such offenders might have a mental disorder21 as well, most
likely a complex combination of forms of disorder, and suggested that such offenders should receive an
OLR together with a hospital direction: this would mean that they would be detained in the high secure
setting of the State Hospital and could be transferred to prison if treatment was no longer appropriate22.
The Millan Committee believed that capacity should be a central component of the process for
authorising civil detention on the ground of mental disorder: its formulation was to require that the
judgment of the patient be significantly impaired as a result of mental disorder23. It also gave
15 Para 15.14. Naturally, a penal sentence could be imposed
in the event of non-cooperation.
16 Para 15.17. 
17 The Committee also suggested that the role of the
Secretary of State be replaced by an extended role for the
Tribunal to approve leave and transfer decisions, since it
was more appropriate that such important decisions be
taken by a judicial body rather than by central government
as they were essential precursors to release and so relevant
to the human rights standard that release should be
governed by a judicial body: paras 15.19ff. The Secretary
of State would be a party to the Tribunal. The Committee
also recommended that the conditional discharge regime be
continued, though this would be to provide for recall to
hospital since the Committee recommended that the effect
of a detention order would be to allow in-patient or out-
patient treatment and so there would be no need for a
conditional discharge for that purpose: paras 15.24ff.
18 New Directions, SE/2001/56.
19 SE/2000/68
20 Chapters 5 and 6; this would be available if the offender
had committed a violent or sexual offence or another
offense showing a propensity to such offending, and there
were reasonable grounds for believing that there was a
substantial and continuing risk to the public (which would
require a formal risk assessment) such as to require such
an order.
21 Defined in the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 as
amended by the Mental Health (Public Safety and
Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999 as ‘mental illness
(including personality disorder) or mental handicap
however caused or manifested’. The replacement for the
1984 Act, the Mental Health (Care and Treatment)
(Scotland) Act 2003, maintained a similar definition:
s328 provides that “(1) … “mental disorder” means any –
(a) mental illness; (b) personality disorder; or (c) learning
disability, however caused or manifested …” This followed
the recommendations if the Millan Committee, see ch 4 of
New Directions.
22 Chapter 7
23 Chapter 5, paras 40ff. At para 41, it noted “We propose
that it should not be possible for a compulsory intervention
to be made under mental health law unless there is
evidence that the person’s judgment is significantly
impaired, as a result of mental disorder, so as to justify the
intervention. This expresses a broadly similar concept to
incapacity, but is felt to be a less legalistic formulation, and
one which may be easier to apply in practice. It may also
be a term which is easier for service users to accept than
the term ‘incapable’.”
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consideration to the question of the approach to be taken in relation to offenders with mental disorder24,
concluded that protecting the public from risk was a proper legislative object and identified the need for
a framework that provided for “the range of legislative needs, including … protection of the public from
those who may pose a risk to others”25, but it recommended that the criteria for detention through the
criminal process should be the same as for civil detention26.
In relation to high risk offenders, the Millan Committee agreed with the MacLean Committee that some
such offenders would have complex disorders, but also set out its view that others might have an untreated
mental illness and would not pose a high risk after appropriate treatment, and so could be dealt with by way
of the existing hospital order regime without any need for anything such as an OLR27. 
As had been the view of the Richardson Committee, the Millan Committee was content for the Restriction
Order regime to continue28. It was also able to give brief consideration29 to those who were unfit to stand
trial because of their mental disorder – ‘insanity in bar of trial’30 – and found to have committed the actus
reus of the charge31; and also those found fit to stand trial but to have been insane at the time of the offence
and so not guilty by reason of insanity32. Such findings allowed the court to impose an appropriate order for
either hospital or community care. The Committee noted that various practical problems had arisen, namely
a lack of fit between the legal questions posed and the clinical understanding of these constructs, and delays
in dealing with the cases in court because of difficulties in arranging the necessary medical evidence in a
timely fashion. Their main conclusion was that the whole area, and the question of diminished responsibility
as a partial defence to murder, should be subject to a full review by the Scottish Law Commission33.
24 The statutory regime then in place in Scotland had the power
to impose mental health disposals in one statute (the
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, whereas the
effects of the disposals were set out in the Mental Health
(Scotland) Act 1984. The Committee noted that some
people saw advantages to this, both from the point of view of
having a comprehensive code for the criminal justice system,
which might also encourage an integrated response to
mentally disordered offenders from the system which tends to
have to deal with them, namely the criminal justice system.
However, their view was that it was better to have all
provisions relating to mental disorder in one statute: ch 24.
25 Chapter 2, para 22.
26 Chapter 26, para 15. The Committee had been concerned
about facilities in prisons and had concluded that
compulsory treatment in a prison setting would not be
right: ch 26, paras 59ff. This led it to reject the idea of
having the conditions of a community treatment order
relating to treatment continuing to have effect in prison.
The Committee did also note that the more important
question in the criminal context might well be ensuring
access to treatment: at para 1 of ch 26, the Committee
noted that there were some problems in relation to the
availability of facilities, particularly for young people and
female offenders with self-harming behaviour. 
27 Chapter 27, para 9.
28 Chapter 27, paras 15ff discuss the Restriction Order: there
is no suggestion that they be abolished. The Committee
suggested that the discharge of such patients – who at that
time could appeal to the Sheriff (s63 of the 1984 Act) or
be discharged by the Scottish Ministers – become a matter
for the Parole Board (sitting as the Restricted Patients
Review Board): ch 27, paras 41ff; though it also suggested
that the Mental Health Tribunal it proposed in relation to
civil patients should also have jurisdiction over restricted
patients: ch 27, para 49.
29 Chapter 29
30 The test – set out in MH Advocate v Wilson 1942 JC 75
– involves a mental disorder preventing the giving of
instructions or following the evidence; English law has a
similar test, in R v Pritchard (1836) 7 C&P 303.
31 This process is carried out pursuant to the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995; there is a similar process
in England and Wales, introduced by the Criminal
Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991.
32 The test in Scotland is whether mental disorder prevented
a defendant from controlling his conduct: HM Advocate v
Kidd 1960 JC 61. This is wider than the M’Naghten
Rules (based on M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl&F
200) applicable in England and Wales, which require that
the defendant’s delusions cause him not to know the
nature or quality of the act or that it was unlawful.
33 This was done: the Scottish Law Commission issued a
Discussion Paper in January 2003 and its Report in July
2004 (SE/2004/92), which proposed that there be a
defence of lack of criminal responsibility if mental disorder
means that the person cannot appreciate the nature or
wrongfulness of conduct (but excluding from this a
personality disorder characterised by abnormally aggressive
or seriously irresponsible conduct); and that a person be
unfit for trial if a mental or physical disorder means that
effective participation is not possible. 
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One additional feature of the regime, which had recently proved controversial, had to be considered, the
need to be satisfied as to the “treatability” of patients with personality disorders34. An order for discharge
in a highly-publicised case where there was felt to be an ongoing risk to the public but the treatability
requirement was not met35 led to the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999, which
required the detention of a restricted patient who did not meet the treatability test if detention was
necessary to protect the public from serious harm36. The Millan Committee suggested that this test be
removed, since the hospital system should be used only for those who could be treated: this approach
allows the hospital system to be used where protecting the public coincides with the treatment of mental
disorder, but protecting the public in other situations is a matter for the criminal justice system37.
(iii) The Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003
The Scottish Parliament, which had been the first UK legislature to put in place a comprehensive
framework in relation to adults without capacity – the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 – soon
enacted legislation based to a significant extent on the recommendations of the Millan Committee. The
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 – the main provisions of which were brought into
effect in October 200538 – made long term compulsion in the civil setting dependent on the making of a
Compulsory Treatment Order by the new Mental Health Tribunal39: the test for this order, which can be
on an in-patient or out-patient basis, is set out in s64 and requires various findings, including that the
patient’s mental disorder leads to a significant impairment in the making of decisions about treatment and
that treatment is necessary to avoid a significant risk to the patient or other others40. In other words, the
Scottish Parliament has engaged with the principles that (i) capacity should be central, which means that
those who retain the ability to make true decisions cannot be compelled, at least not in the civil setting;
a decision is not a true one under the statutory test if there is a significant impairment to decision-making
caused by the disorder; and (ii) danger posed to others is also a basis for intervention in the civil setting,
but not as an alternative to the impaired capacity test, which has to be met in any event.
In the criminal justice setting, however, the changes introduced were less radical and did not go as far as
the Millan Committee had recommended. Parts 8 and following of the 2003 Act provide for orders that
can be made by the criminal courts, by adding sections to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 199541.
34 Section 17 of the 1984 Act; there was an equivalent
requirement in ss3 and 37 of the English Act of 1983.
35 See Ruddle v Secretary of State for Scotland [1999]
Mental Health Law Reports 159. This led to an inquiry
for the Scottish Parliament conducted by the Mental
Welfare Commission for Scotland: see Report of the
Inquiry into the Care and Treatment of Noel Ruddle,
available at
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/bills/billsPassed
/rudr-01.htm (last accessed 29 August 2009)
36 This was upheld, subsequently to the Millan Report, in a
challenge in the European Court of Human Rights: Reid v
UK [2003] Mental Health Law Reports 226, the Court
rejecting a suggestion that detention was only possible if
the disorder was treatable.
37 Chapter 28, para 18ff: 
38 See Scottish Statutory Instrument 2005 No 161, The
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act
2003 (Commencement No 4) Order 2005
39 Sections 57ff; only the new Mental Health Tribunal can
make the order.
40 A short-term detention certificate may be made under s44
if an approved medical practitioner (s22 – a medical
practitioner having suitable expertise) certifies the
likelihood of, inter alia, mental disorder (ie mental illness,
personality disorder or learning disability: s328),
significant impairment of ability to make decisions as to
medical treatment and significant risk to the health, safety
or welfare of the patient or to the safety of others in the
absence of treatment.
41 The Millan Committee’s recommendation that the criteria
for the making of criminal orders be part of the same
legislation as the civil regime was not followed.
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The main order that can be made after conviction, the Compulsion Order, differs from a civil order in
that there is no requirement that the defendant have any impaired capacity: what is needed 42 is that
there is mental disorder, that treatment for the disorder is available, that the absence of treatment would
result in a significant risk to the health, safety or welfare of the offender or the safety of another, and that
the order is necessary. Of course, in determining whether an order is “necessary”, a relevant factor might
be whether or not the defendant has the capacity to make treatment decisions, since its absence might
be a factor in favour of making the order. The Millan Committee’s view that the criteria for a hospital
order should be the same as those for a civil order, noted above, was rejected by the Scottish Executive,
which stated in the Policy Memorandum accompanying the Bill that became the 2003 Act43: 
“191. The civil criteria are designed to ensure that a patient is only placed under compulsion and
deprived of their liberty when there are grounds for over-ruling the patient’s autonomy. The forensic
criteria are directed at ensuring that a court disposal and any continuing compulsion are appropriate,
given all the circumstances of the offender’s mental disorder and offence. We believe this difference
is justified in the context of criminal disposals, where the alternative to a mental health order may be
prison. The aim is to place the emphasis on the patient’s need for appropriate care and treatment
rather than on a person’s willingness to accept the care and treatment. The intention is also that the
criteria should not preclude voluntary transfer of prisoners to hospital under the Bill, when that is the
most appropriate course of action. 
The proposal to remove the effect of the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999
was also rejected: the legislation had by then been upheld by the Privy Council (and subsequently was
upheld by the European Court of Human Rights)44.
(iv) The Mental Health Act 2001 and Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 – Ireland45
In response to an admissibility decision in the European Court of Human Rights challenging the absence
of an effective court review of detention46, the Oireachtas in Ireland passed the Mental Health Act 2001,
which came into effect in 200647. The Act’s definition of “mental disorder”48, which is the key to the use
of compulsion, requires “mental illness, severe dementia or significant intellectual disability” which (a)
causes “ … a serious likelihood of the person concerned causing immediate and serious harm to himself
or herself or to other persons”, or (b) is of a degree such that “the judgment of the person concerned is
so impaired that failure to admit the person to an approved centre would be likely to lead to a serious
deterioration in his or her condition or would prevent the administration of appropriate treatment that
42 Section 133 of the 2003 Act, inserting s57A into the
1995 Act. The order can be renewed by a Tribunal after
6 months if the criteria still apply, and then for 12 months
at a time: see s139ff of the 2003 Act.
43 Mental Health (Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 64), 16 September
2002, Policy Memorandum, available at
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/bills/billsnotInP
rogress/index.htm#64 (last accessed 29 August 2009)
44 See Policy Memorandum paras 181ff; the case law is
Anderson, Docherty and Reid v Scottish Ministers [2001]
Mental Health Law Reports 192 and Reid v UK [2003]
Mental Health Law Reports 226.
45 For a more comprehensive account of the Irish legislation,
see Prof Anselm Eldergill’s two-part article, ‘The Best is
the Enemy of the Good: The Mental Health Act 2001’,
Journal of Mental Health Law, May 2008, pp21–37, and
Spring 2009, pp7–18.
46 Croke v Ireland [1999] Mental Health Law Reports 118;
the friendly settlement of the case, on 21 December 2000,
involved its withdrawal on the basis that what was then
the Mental Health Bill 1999 would pass into law. There
had been previous proposed Bills, but they had not
progressed.
47 The Mental Health Act 2001 (Commencement) Order
2006, SI No 411 of 2006 brought the act into force from
1 November 2006.
48 Section 3 of the Act.
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could be given only by such admission”, and admission would be beneficial49. Again, the legislature
involved has placed lack of capacity as a central feature in the justification for detention, whilst also
making harm to others an important matter. The 2001 Act does not have any provisions relating to orders
made by the criminal courts in relation to mentally disordered offenders, though it does provide that a
Tribunal must authorise the transfer of a civil patient to the secure Central Hospital (s21(2)). 
Further legislation was passed to deal with the criminal justice sector, the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act
2006. This statute deals with fitness to stand trial, findings of not guilty by reason of insanity and also
transfers of prisoners to hospital. Section 4, which sets the test for fitness to stand trial, allows an order
for treatment in a designated centre50, but this requires a finding of “mental disorder” as defined in the
2001 Act; s5, relating to findings of insanity, is similar51. In relation to the transfer of prisoners –
sentenced or remand prisoners52 – the provisions are, however, somewhat different53: the first relevant
question is whether the prisoner has a “mental disorder for which he or she cannot be afforded
appropriate care or treatment within the prison”; transfer is then possible if the prisoner “voluntarily
consents” or if two or more doctors certify that the transfer should occur because the treatment cannot
be provided. That allows the transfer to be effectuated “notwithstanding that the prisoner is unwilling or
unable to voluntarily consent to the transfer”. In summary, a patient found unfit to stand trial or not
guilty by reason of insanity is treated as though he or she were a civil patient, with impaired judgment
being a basis for detention; but a serving prisoner requires either agreement to transfer or two medical
opinions in the absence of capacity or agreement if the prisoner has capacity.
(v) The Mental Health Act 2007
By the time, then, that the Westminster Parliament came to decide on the reform to the Mental Health
Act 1983 for England and Wales, it had an expert committee recommendation on making capacity
central, and further expert reports and models of legislation from other parts of the UK and from Ireland
that suggested the importance in modern legislation of capacity. In addition, the Westminster Parliament
had also put in place a framework to regulate the approach to adults with limited or no capacity, the
Mental Capacity Act 2005, though not in relation to those placed under the Mental Health Act 198354.
There was a significant time period between the Richardson Committee’s recommendations and the
Mental Health Act 2007, which was marked by a number of false starts towards legislation55, but a
49 In MR v Sligo Mental Health Services [2007] IEHC 73,
2 March 2007, O’Neill J commented that the language of
the statute provides two bases for detention, but that “they
are not alternative to each other” and that they are likely
to overlap. It is difficult to know precisely what His
Honour means, namely whether or not both of the two
bases have to be met on the facts.
50 This includes the Central Mental Hospital; other
“psychiatric centres” may be designated (s3 of the Act),
and s13 indicates that they might well be prisons.
51 It requires “mental disorder”, but does not tie it to mental
disorder for the purposes of the 2001 Act; s1 of 2006 act
provides that ““mental disorder” includes mental illness,
mental disability, dementia or any disease of the mind but
does not include intoxication”; the mental disorder has to
be “such that the accused person ought not to be held
responsible for the act alleged by reason of the fact that he
or she – (i) did not know the nature and quality of the act,
or (ii) did not know that what he or she was doing was
wrong, or (iii) was unable to refrain from committing the
act”. However, the disposal on such a finding may involve
compulsory treatment if there is a finding of mental
disorder as defined in the 2001 Act.
52 Defined in s1 of the Act
53 See s15 of the Act.
54 Section 28 of the 2005 Act effectively gives priority to the
provisions in the 1983 Act relating to treatment.
55 There was a Green Paper (Cmnd 4480, November
1999), a White Paper Cm 5016-I, December 2000), a
Draft Bill 2002 (Cm 5538-I) and a further Draft Bill of
2004 (Cm 6305-I), which was subject to pre-legislative
scrutiny by the Joint Committee on the Mental Health Bill
(Session 2004–5, HL Paper 79-I, HC 95-I), to which the
government responded (Cm 6624, July 2005); eventually,
the Mental Health Bill 2006 was introduced to the House
of Lords in November 2006 (HL Bill 1, Session 2006–7).
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consistent line from the Government was that capacity would not be made part of the test for detention
and efforts to make it part of the test were rebuffed. Rather, the emphasis was on public safety or
preventing self-harm. A few extracts from the lengthy process leading to reform give a flavour of the
approach adopted. 
The Green Paper of November 1999 that was published along with the Richardson Committee report
called for views to be expressed on the recommendation that capacity be made central to the test for
detention: but the Green Paper indicated56 that 
“The principal concern about this approach is that it introduces a notion of capacity, which, in
practice, may not be relevant to the final decision on whether a patient should be made subject to a
compulsory order. It is the degree of risk that patients with mental disorder pose, to themselves or
others, that is crucial to this decision. In the presence of such risk, questions of capacity – while still
relevant to the plan of care and treatment – may be largely irrelevant to the question of whether or
not a compulsory order should be made.”
When the Draft Bill of 2004 was subject to pre-legislative scrutiny, the Joint Committee of both Houses
of Parliament recommended the adoption of the Scottish Parliament’s approach of including impaired
capacity as a precondition for detention57. The Government position had been set out to the Joint
Committee, the reasons for objecting to capacity as a central component being58:
– it would not prevent harm to patients and others;
– professionals would have a very flexible approach to the test in order to ensure that people were
treated;
– people with fluctuating capacity would receive inconsistent treatment and have periods of relapse
and recovery;
– it would be impossible to treat under compulsion many people with personality disorders.
However, the Joint Committee felt that these difficulties could be overcome in practice and did not justify
the position adopted by the Government59: put shortly
– it was a necessary addition to ensure that the legislation covered only psychiatric conditions, in light
of the very broad definition of mental disorder60, namely “an impairment of or a disturbance in the
functioning of the mind or brain resulting from any disability or disorder of the mind or brain”; since
this could cover many physical and neurological disorders61; the use of an impaired capacity test
would answer concerns about the breadth of the proposed new regime;
56 Page 32, ch 5, para 6
57 Para 71 of its report; it heard submissions and evidence,
printed as HL Paper 79-II and HC 95-II for Session
2004–5.
58 Paragraph 152.
59 Paragraphs 153–156.
60 Clause 2.5 of the Draft Bill, a definition that was
supported by the Joint Committee but on the basis that it
would be accompanied by a set of exclusions – as to
substance misuse, sexual orientation and cultural and
political beliefs and behaviours – that the Government was
not proposing should be included. See paragraphs 87–114.
61 At para 88, the Joint Committee noted of the extended
definition of mental disorder that “Many experts told the
Committee that the proposed definition would result in
people suffering from a wide range of physical conditions
not covered by the current Act being brought within the
ambit of the new Bill. It was suggested that those with
epilepsy, people who have suffered traumatic brain
damage, and those suffering from neurological disorders
such as multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease or metabolic
disorders would be covered by the new definition because
of the psychological and behavioural symptoms of their
conditions.
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– it would approximate the test for best interests in what became the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and
reduce the emphasis on risk (since the test for capacity takes into account the consequences of the
decision) whilst allowing intervention without a discriminatory regime that makes a special case of
mentally-ill people;
– it was inconsistent to ignore capacity and autonomy in relation to the criteria for detention but
make it central in relation to other areas, such as ECT62 or psychosurgery63.
The Government issued a formal response to the Joint Committee’s Report64, and rejected most of its
recommendations, including those in relation to the impaired capacity test, noting “it is not safe to
assume that there is a link between the severity of a condition – and therefore the need for treatment –
and the person’s ability to make decisions”65. 
When a Bill was finally introduced into Parliament in 2006, the House of Lords did add a clause making
it a precondition for civil detention (either for assessment under s2 or treatment under s3 of the 1983
Act) that “because of his mental disorder, his ability to make decisions about the provision of medical
treatment is significantly impaired”66. The central arguments in favour that featured in the debate were:
(i) decision-making capacity was central in relation to other forms of medical treatment, and should be
central in relation to mental health because there was no great contrast in terms of ability to participate67;
it was part of good professional practice in any event, including in mental health work, was part of the
test as to detention in Scotland (where it did not seem to be causing a problem), and in the English
legislation was already relevant in relation to decisions about medication beyond three months and ECT68
and psychosurgery69; (ii) allowing people to retain some decision-making capacity about their treatment
would make them more likely to present themselves; and for those placed in the mental health system,
there would be more compliance because the loss of the ability to make decisions was a source of
frustration and could lead to non-compliance and a position of opposition to the clinicians who were
viewed as having an “upper hand” in a relationship and not taking the views of patients seriously; in other
words, it would promote confidence in the system by users70, which would raise the prospects of it being
successful; (iii) assessment of capacity was to become a matter required on a daily basis with the
introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and making it a necessary focus for mental health clinicians
would enable them to identify patients who did not recognise their own illness, who might present the
most serious risk. 
62 Clause 179 of the Draft Bill indicated that ECT would
require the consent of an adult patient with capacity. This
became law: see s27 Mental Health Act 2007, adding
s58A Mental Health Act 1983.
63 See s57 Mental Health Act 1983.
64 July 2005, Department of Health, Cm 6624
65 Page 16.
66 Moved and adopted at the Committee Stage: HL
Hansard, 10 January 2007, Vol 688, col 228ff.
Specifically referred to in the debate was a study
conducted by Prof Szmuckler that indicated that 85% of
those assessed just after admission under compulsory
powers at The Maudsley Hospital in London did not have
capacity, and so a higher proportion would meet the lower
test of impaired decision-making: col 235.
67 Baroness Barker, who moved the relevant amendment
stated at col 230 “In mental health, as in all other aspects
of healthcare, there is a growing recognition that the
involvement and compliance of patients in their treatment,
and in maintaining their treatment regimes, rests on their
ability to be part of the decision-making about it.”
68 Section 58 of the 1983 Act required consent from a patient
with capacity or the authority of a second opinion doctor.
69 Section 57 of the 1983 Act required consent from a
patient with capacity and the authority of a second opinion
doctor. 
70 Baroness Murphy, who made some points in favour of this
proposition noted that this might in particular be of
assistance to populations that were statistically
overrepresented in the system, in particular black
communities: see col 236.
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The only opposition to this amendment in the debate came from the Government minister in charge of
taking the Bill through the House of Lords, Lord Hunt71, who commented that “[t]he primary purpose of
the legislation is to protect people from the harm that may be caused by mental disorder” and as such was
to be contrasted with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which was designed “to provide a way of intervening
where people cannot make their own decisions”. The question of compulsion turned on “the needs of
patients and the risk that their disorder poses to themselves and to others, not their decision-making
ability” and an impaired decision-making test “could result in some patients going untreated and thereby
harming themselves or others”72; this – leaving people to harm themselves or commit a crime they would
not otherwise commit – was not something that promoted autonomy, whereas treating people so that they
could recover from serious mental disorder would allow them better to operate autonomously. He restated
the previously-indicated position that medical professionals would misreport impaired capacity in order
to ensure treatment, and that the test would cause the premature discharge of patients who regained their
capacity before their treatment was complete and who would then have to be discharged to deteriorate
again. Moreover, he did not accept that reluctant patients would be more likely to comply if the pre-
conditions for compulsion included an impaired decision-making clause. The Government majority in the
House of Commons reversed the impaired capacity clause inserted by the House of Lords: this was done
at the Committee stage of the Bill. Though the issue took up one and a half of the 12 sittings of the
Committee, the arguments were along the same lines as those presented in the Lords, with one side
emphasising risk and the other emphasising autonomy and the need to avoid discrimination as between
physical and mental illness. The vote was along party lines73. 
Accordingly, the question of capacity is not relevant to the test for detention under the civil provisions
for England and Wales, except in an indirect fashion: the White Paper of December 2000, for example,
noted that the question of whether the nature and degree of the disorder required detention would
include consideration of the question of the patient’s capacity to make relevant decisions74. With no
apparent realisation as to the juxtaposition, capacity was however central in another element of the new
regime. Consent to treatment for a 16–18 year old could be given by his or her parents. The White Paper
suggested that, in part because of “the increasing recognition of the capacity of a developing young person
to take decisions”, it should be made clear that the absence of consent from that group would require the
use of compulsory powers rather than any reliance on parental powers to consent75: this became law
under the 2007 Act76. In other words, questions of capacity are of vital importance in determining who
could give consent for an informal admission, but in a non-consensual admission capacity was only of
tangential relevance in light of its potential to affect the assessment of the nature or degree of the
disorder. 
At no stage in the process of reform did capacity on the part of those in the criminal justice system
become a central feature. There were, rather, a number of reasons given as to why those who entered the
mental health system via the criminal courts should be subject to differential treatment involving less
stringent conditions. For example, when the Joint Committee was considering the Draft Bill of 2004, it
recommended that the criteria for detention include a requirement that the disorder be of a nature or
71 Starting at col 243.
72 He acknowledged the research of Prof Szmuckler, but
noted that as some people would escape compulsion, this
would be an “unacceptable gap”.
73 See the Third and Fourth sittings of the Public Bill
Committee, 26 April 2007, cols 79–120. Available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk//pa/cm200607/cmp
ublic/cmpbment.htm (last accessed 25 August 2009)
74 Paragraph 3.24.
75 Paragraphs 3.70ff.
76 Section 43 of the 2007 Act, amending s131 of the 1983
statute.
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degree to make treatment appropriate irrespective of whether the defendant would consent to
treatment77. The Government position was that the civil criterion that voluntary treatment was not
possible had to be omitted because otherwise a patient willing to attend hospital voluntarily would have
to be subject to a prison sentence78. Also missing was any requirement that treatment be necessary to
protect the patient or others from harm: the Government position was that this pre-condition was
justified in relation to a civil patient as the basis for depriving the patient of his or her liberty, whereas in
the criminal setting the justification arose from the fact that a court order was made; and the danger of
including a criterion reflecting the need to protect someone from themselves was that this could be met
by a prison sentence79. 
(vi) The Bamford Review – Northern Ireland
Reporting in August 2007, the Bamford Review of Mental Health and Learning Disability80 provided a
suggested framework to replace the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986. Article 3 of the 1986
Order defines mental disorder as “mental illness, mental handicap and any other disorder or disability of
mind” but expressly excludes those whose only diagnosis is of a “personality disorder”. The criteria for
detention for treatment, as set in Art 12, require an opinion that the absence of detention involves “a
substantial likelihood of serious physical harm to himself or to other persons”. In relation to detention
ordered by the criminal courts, Art 44(2) allows a hospital order if there is “mental illness or severe
mental impairment of a nature or degree which warrants his detention in hospital for medical treatment”
and the order is the more suitable disposal. 
The message of the Bamford Review was that the 1986 Order had significant gaps, and it suggested that
the opportunity be taken to provide a comprehensive legislative framework based on a number of central
principles. The Committee set out four over-arching principles that provided a “sound ethical basis for
legislation” and “recognise and support the dignity of the person”, namely81:
“i. – Autonomy – respecting the person’s capacity to decide and act on his own and his right not to
be subject to restraint by others.
ii. – Justice – applying the law fairly and equally.
iii. – Benefit – promoting the health, welfare and safety of the person, while having regard to the safety
of others.
iv. – Least Harm – acting in a way that minimises the likelihood of harm to the person.”
The Committee’s preference was for one legal framework that dealt with all issues arising in relation to
capacity and mental health which “should apply in a non-discriminatory way to both physical and mental
health decisions, as well as to welfare and financial needs”82. In other words, the separate area of law
relating to mental health law should become a sub-set of the law relating to what happens when someone
has a loss of capacity to act autonomously. Capacity law should develop and incorporate mental health
77 Paragraphs 272–3.
78 Paragraphs 267–268. This was a position similar to that
adopted by the Scottish Executive (and Parliament, given
that the 2003 Act passed as it did) in relation to why
impaired judgment should not be part of the test for a
detention order in the criminal setting: see infra.
79 Paragraphs 267 and 269. The Joint Committee also
rejected this viewpoint in its recommendations.
80 Its extensive collection of papers can be found at
http://www.rmhldni.gov.uk/index.htm (last accessed 29
August 2009). References here are to the report entitled 
‘A Comprehensive Legislative Framework’.
81 See para 1.8; the consequences of the principles were
expanded upon in chapter 5 of the report.
82 Para 5.3.
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law “whilst ensuring appropriate protections”83; practical arrangements would be put in place for the
assessment of capacity. However, the Committee noted that it would then be necessary to consider how
this intersected with legislation relating to children and also “the consequence of adopting such an
approach for forensic patients and the interface with the Criminal Justice System”84. Its starting point in
relation to the latter was that the principles-based approach it adopted meant that those who had
capacity and made decisions to commit crime would have to be dealt with through the criminal justice
system85. Of course, it would be possible to have an intervention that was based both on the need to
protect the patient and to protect others if the patient’s autonomy was compromised so as to prevent a
decision with respect to the particular risks in issue. 
The Northern Ireland Government has been broadly supportive of the suggestions of the Bamford
Review. Its initial response was entitled “Delivering the Bamford Vision”86: after discussions between
interested departments within the Northern Ireland Government, it was accepted that there was a need
for a new framework for mental health and capacity law, but it was proposed87 that there should be two
pieces of legislation, the first amending the 1986 Order because of the “urgent need” for that – though
the timescale was given as it being enacted only in 2011 – and then new mental capacity legislation was
to follow. The suggestion made was that putting both together in a single statute “would lead to a very
complex piece of legislation which may be difficult to implement”; unfortunately, no reason is given for
this assertion88. The Government response is also far from clear as to what would be the interface with
the criminal justice system: the chapter dealing with forensic matters89 notes the need for service
provision, including for people with personality disorders and those detained in prison, but does not give
any details on what is proposed in this area.
After the consultation on this initial position, the Northern Ireland Government has produced an
updated proposal, entitled “Legislative Framework for Mental Capacity and Mental Health Legislation in
Northern Ireland”90, which retains the idea that there will be separate legislation on mental health and
questions of capacity but proposes that the two relevant bills should be introduced at the same time. It is
also noted that the legislation relating to mental health matters, which may be in the form of an
amendment to the 1986 Order or be a new statute, will be harmonised with the mental capacity
legislation “to form a coherent framework”91. The timeframe envisages new legislation by April 2011. The
mental health law will adopt the Scottish approach: so, it is noted that the proposed criteria for detention
for assessment or treatment will include as a pre-requisite that the patient is found to have a “significantly
impaired decision-making ability in relation to treatment” because of mental disorder92. How this applies
to people in the criminal justice system is not clarified.
83 So at paras 5.57ff the Committee comments on the need
to ensure public protection when a person with impaired
capacity poses a threat to others (which it notes is not a
frequent occurrence).
84 Paras 5.5. and 5.6. The Committee noted at para 5.55
that there was a need to ensure that the law relating to
criminal responsibility and matters such as unfitness to
stand trial, and also the law relating to matters such as
transfers from prison to hospital, was amended to comply
with the principles-based approach. The “equivalence”
requirement means that those in the criminal justice system
have the equivalent access to services: para 5.56.
85 Para 5.53.
86 Available at http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/showconsultations
?txtid=30219 (last accessed 19 October 2009).
87 Ibid pp 25ff
88 The Northern Ireland Executive’s proposals were put out for
consultation, and the responses were collated in ‘Summary of
Key Points Arising from Consultation’, March 2009,
available at the same website. One of the points made – on
page 7 of the document – was that there was “strong
opposition to the proposal for two pieces of legislation”.
89 Ibid pp 68ff
90 Available at www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/legislative-framework-
for-mental-capacity.pdf (last accessed 19 October 2009)
91 Paragraph 6.1.
92 Paragraphs 8.5 and 8.6.
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